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Richard Eldridge

SELF-UNDERSTANDING AND COMMUNITY
IN WORDSWORTH'S POETRY

Prior to die rise of modern science in die seventeenth century, to understand oneself was to know one's place in a ideologically organized
universe. Human actions, together with natural events in general, were

intelligible as aiming at the realization of given purposes or ends. To be a
human person was to have a particular sort of end: intellectual contemplation, according to Aristotle, or oneness with God, according to Augustine.
Self-knowledge becomes problematic, however, once events in nature
are conceived in terms of the new physics to be only materially caused, not
purposive. Given that human actions are events in nature, physical explanations then seem to be both necessary and sufficient for understanding
them. It then becomes no longer possible to understand and explain one's
actions as grounded in a partial grasp of an intelligible order of things.
The self, it seems, is not real; bits of matter are, and their motions are

mechanical, not plotted in a divinely ordered book of nature. Thus the self
or the person as a locus of autonomous agency and understanding tends to
come to be regarded as a fiction, not a physical something and not effective in the occurrence of events, so not a something at all. Human actions
tend no longer to be seen as stemming from persons who can alter and are
responsible for diem, but instead as complex events falling under physical
laws.

Yet despite the revolutionary revisions in the explanation of human action and die account of personhood seemingly forced by the new physics,

self-knowledge is not something easily abandoned in favor of knowledge of
matter. It is not easy to conceive of one's actions as nonpurposive and of
oneself as an unreal playdiing of fortune. Determinism seems incompati-

ble with individual responsibility and hence with morality. Determinists
make claims, investigate things, and regard diese activities as significant
273
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and under their control, yet it is hard to see how this could be if physicalist
determinism were true. Even within modern scientific understanding,
autonomous creativity and human understanding are generally allotted
roles in experimentation as well as in the rest of life. Yet this acknowledgment of human autonomy is seemingly in fundamental conflict with the
commitment to the explanation of all events under physical laws that is
characteristic of the modern scientific attitude.1

In the absence, however, of a well worked out description of how we
can autonomously generate partial understandings of our proper ends as
persons, understandings to which we then give expression in action, these

objections will seem hollow, and the sense diat it must be possible to explain our actions fully under physical laws will press upon us. If we cannot
say how we can understand ourselves and our end in ways that inform our
actions, then it will seem wise to abandon trying to understand agentive

persons and to try instead to formulate the physical explanations of the
motions of our bodies that are seemingly in order.
Here Wordsworth's poetry can be of special value, for one of Wordsworth's chief poetic concerns was to diagnose and locate skepticism about

the possibility of self-understanding as a natural but temporary stage in
the lives of persons who can grasp their proper end. Skepticism about

action-guiding self-understanding, on his showing, is a plight of mind to
which self-conscious end-directed beings succumb just as they most fully
assert their particularity and separateness from others. Recovery from this
plight occurs naturally when they come both to see that genuine autonomy

requires community with others in a particular sort of expressive activity
and to find themselves already so engaged. Further self-conscious and ef-

fective engagement in this expressive activity then emerges as the proper
end of persons and as an end that is to be achieved communally. The

scandal of philosophy, as Wordsworth would have it, is diat this natural
development of die mind, a development Wordsworth traces throughout
his own career, should be ignored in favor of die pursuit of overly abstract,
narrow, and impoverishing causal explanations of our behavior.
Wordsworth thus offers us a detailed and comprehensive description of

how action-guiding self-understanding of our end is possible. If his account of his career is convincing, so that we can see our own natural

plights of mind and possibilities of recovery reflected in it, then we will be
able after following it out to say a good deal about how we are able to
understand ourselves and our end, and we will be able to locate the in-

vestigation of causal relations as not the sole route to understanding
anything in nature, but rather as one activity among many in the lives of

Richard Eldridge275

self-conscious moral beings naturally directed and directing diemselves to
a given end. Rehearsing Wordsworth's account of his development and
checking its plausibility is hence a way for us to test our own possibUities of
self-understanding.

In characterizing his poetic project in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads,
Wordsworth remarks that he has attempted, by following certain principles, to produce "a class of Poetry . . . well adapted to interest mankind
permanently, and not unimportant in the quality, and in die multiplicity
of its moral relations."2 That is, it is the aim of his poetry to reveal to us
how our nature leads us both to act and to be bound to act in certain ways,
to come to stand in certain moral relations. To know that our nature so

leads us would be to possess self-knowledge of permanent interest.
This poetic project is to be accomplished "by tracing [in various 'incidents and situations from common life'] . . . the primary laws of our

nature: chiefly, as regards the manner in which we associate ideas in a
state of excitement" (Pref., p. 447). The poet seeks to reveal how and
what, given our shared nature, we think and feel in various circumstances

and furthermore what forms of life are appropriate for beings who think
and feel in diese ways. Poetic power consists in die ability to speak as an
immediately responsive human being, not as an essentially particular per-

son, and possession of diis power is tested in the responses of odiers to the

poet's speech. Cultivation of diis power for affective and normative speaking is me sole route to self-understanding, so that cultivation of this power
is necessary for leading die life of a person who lives according to a partial
conception of objective value.

Wordsworth's poetry is thus fundamentally shaped by his sense diat
self-characterizations are necessary for leading a stable, coherent life expressive of who one is and by his sense diat empirical observation alone
yields no self-characterizations that are bodi morally informative and
believable. In contrast with die putatively empirically grounded, but in
fact unfounded and useless, claims about the operations of the mind put
forward by scientists, Wordsworth offers us only "best conjectures [of] Our
Being's earthly progress,"3 and he insists diat such conjectures must

suffice, if anything does, in enabling adequate and morally significant selfcharacterizations. Conjectures are explicidy die sorts of claims that are

tested for plausibility dirough such diings as conversation with odiers
(both imaginary and real), rehearsals of past evidence of a talent for con-
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jecturing, and their acceptance or rejection by omers. Moreover, to issue
conjectures about oneself is as much a mode of self-creation as it is a mode
of self-observation. When we turn to conjecturing about the unities or
drifts of our personalities in the past and about the appropriateness for us
of various vocations or ways of life, then what happens is, as Hegel put it,
that "consciousness no longer aims tofind itself immediately, but to produce
itself by its own activity. It is itself die End at which its action aims,
whereas in the role of observer it was concerned only with things."4 We

continuously recreate ourselves out of who we already are by positing ends
for ourselves and articulating conceptions of objective value. It is this
ongoing activity of persons that is bodi described and displayed in Wordsworth's poetry in its complex interlocking of self-example and dieoretical
formulation.

The specific occasion of Wordsworth's display and description of his
ongoing self-recreation is an overdetermined problem all at once of artistic
discipline, political judgment, happiness in activity, and the burden of
personhood. As W. B. Gallie has characterized it, Wordsworth's immediate problem as a poet was to blend his primitive responsiveness and
memories, the impulses of his poetry, on the one hand, with his maturity

and craft, on die other, in such a way that poetry of genuine value would
result: "There appeared to be two opposing elements in poetic inspiration:
on the one hand the spontaneous receptivity and response characteristic of
childhood and on die odier hand the self-mastery, the calm of mind, die
conscientiousness of the mature artist. How could these be brought

togedier into a satisfying and productive harmony?"5 Impulse without
craft can issue only in incoherence; craft without impulse can issue only in
the sort of sterility and academicism that Wordsworth scorned in die
Augustans. Only if impulse and craft are blended can the mind engage in

genuinely poetic activity. Book I, lines 1-269, of die Prelude describe
Wordsworth's anxiety about his inability to fit craft to impulse, as his

major poetic work lies, to his mind, before him unaccomplished, until in
line 269 the problem of entering into the state of mind productive of poetry
becomes itself the subject of die Prelude.

The problem of entering into this state of mind is not, however, the
poet's alone. Echoing Plato's analogy between the structures of die soul
and die state, Wordsworth finds the problem of the direction of our

capacities and experiences into poetic activity reflected in the problem of
the proper direction of die state. As James Chandler has noted, "the crisis
we see enacted in book 1 with respect to the psychology of poetic composition is congruent or homologous with the crisis we see narrated in book 1 1
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with respect to die psychology of political morality."6 And beyond analogy
there may even be a causal interrelation between the problem of the poetic
mind and die problem of political judgment. The poet is under an obliga-

tion as poet to win an audience, under "the necessity of giving immediate
pleasure to a human being possessed of that information which may be expected from him ... as a Man" (Pref., p. 454). But if the state, which
provides the public space for human action and development, is badly
directed, then the poet may find diis obligation nearly impossible to
satisfy. Conversely, without the guidance of a poetic vision of die human,
of its place in nature, and of value, die public life of me state may become
hollow and dominated by empty formalisms and false pieties.

Finally, die problem of engaging our capacities and experiences in productive activity in such a way that ongoing self-direction and selfrecognition are possible is neither die poet's nor die politican's alone. It is,
as Gallie has noted, "the wider problem ... of the active happiness,
responsive and responsible, of every good man" (p. 655). How can one
engage in coherent, self-expressive, fulfilling, and recognition-enabling ac-

tivity, especially when this question is raised from a position of reflective
nonactivity? This is what one might call die moral burden of personhood,

for in the absence of character-expressive, recognition-enabling action
there is, one might say, only physical motion or nothing left that is distinctive of responsible agency.

All these worries — die poetic, the political, and die moral — are fused in
the 269 lines that open the Prelude into a general problem of waywardness
or recreance of mind, an inability to invest oneself in any particular activity, in as much as the routes to self-recognition through activity seem
closed. Wordsworth's anxieties about waywardness of mind and die inexpressibility of personhood culminate in the summary passage of the
opening.
Thus my days are past
In contradiction; with no skill to part
Vague longing, haply bred by want of power,
From paramount impulse not to be withstood,
A timorous capacity from prudence,
From circumspection, infinite delay.
Humility and modest awe themselves
Betray me, serving often for a cloak
To a more subtle selfishness; mat now
Locks every function up in blank reserve,
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Now dupes me, trusting to an anxious eye
That with intrusive resdessness beats off

Simplicity and self-presented truth.
Ah! better far than this, to stray about
Voluptuously dirough fields and rural walks,

And ask no record of the hours, resigned
To vacant musing, unreproved neglect
Of all things, and deliberate holiday.
Far better never to have heard the name

Of zeal and just ambition, than to live

Baffled and plagued by a mind that every hour
Turns recreant to her task; takes heart again,

Then feels immediately some hollow thought
Hang like an interdict upon her hopes.

This is my lot; for either still I find
Some imperfection in the chosen theme,
Or see of absolute accomplishment
Much wanting, so much wanting, in myself,

That I recoil and droop, and seek repose
In lisdessness from vain perplexity,

Unprofitably travelling toward the grave,
Like a false steward who hath much received

And renders nodiing back.
(I, 237-69)

Here the image of false stewardship in recreance of mind captures die
sense diat recreance threatens the maintenance and very existence of personhood. To have a mind so baffled and perplexed is to verge on failing to
exercise the capacities of agency, responsibility, and expressive activity
that are definitive of personhood. The affective mark of such a mind, in
Romantic poetry, is melancholy, a burdensome sense of lassitude in feeling oneself to be unable to go on expressively.
Wordsworth's characteristic way out of this recurrent situation is to
dirow himself into the activity of investigating its occurrence and cure.
Thinking about his melancholic condition and transforming it are fused in
writing about and out of it, beginning with die question "Was it for this?"

in line 269 that sets the Prelude on its course. Wordsworth's desperate interest in die conditions oí occurrence and die cure oí waywardness and
melancholy is similarly reflected in the backward-looking lines that open
so many of his most important self-diagnostic poems: "Five years have
passed; five summers with the length / Of five long winters" in "Tintern

Abbey"; "There was a time ..." in the "Intimations Ode"; "Six changeful
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years have vanished . . ."in Book VII, as Wordsworth resumes in 1804

the poem he had begun in 1798 and abandoned in 1799; "There was a
roaring in the wind all night" in "Resolution and Independence." In each

case, die effort is to ask, "what brought me to this condition, and what way
on or out is there?" The "this" of Book I, line 269 thus refers, as James

Chandler has put it, to die nearly inexpressible "situation" of waywardness
and self-dissolution "over which poetry triumphs to come into being" (p.
188) and beyond that to the situation we all must overcome through the
exercise of something like poetic judgment in order to go on living expressively as persons at all. To ask "was it for this?" is, in Wordsworth, to

ask "why am I unable to go on, and how could I now go on, with my life as
a person?"

In responding to this question, Wordsworth is concerned less with a
priori proofs about either the nature of personhood or die nature ofhuman

happiness than he is concerned to discover, as Gallie has it, "die way of
happiness (to use a religious phrase) or (if the phrase be preferred) die art
of it." In other words, Wordsworth does not consider personhood or happiness abstractly or as having transcendent essences, die route to die exemplification of which would always remain a further problem even after
they had been understood. Instead, he looks for a way of expressive activity and human happiness mat is immanent in human life, in particular in
his own.

His answer to [the problem of "die true end of man"] is at once normative
and interpretative; it is an attempt to show the reality of certain "may-bes"

in human experience with a view to convincing us that diese are, in the
ethical sense, "must-bes." . . . [Wordsworth] makes the essential moment
of morality one of recognition. . . . And he believed diat to show [the way
of happiness] was the only way to make men better.7
Wordsworth's strategy dien is to consider how he has so far lived, dience
to reinterpret his present condition as a merely temporary or apparent
disengagement from both a discipline or activity and connections to
others. Under scrutiny, waywardness of mind is seen to disappear in favor
of already established habits of activity and response. As Chandler puts it,
"One's present discipline resides in the habitual contemplation of how one

supposes oneself to have been disciplined in die past" (p. 215).
Wordsworth's normative-interpretive or conjectural approach to the
problem of how to discharge die burden of personhood in expressive ac-

tivity is thus radically opposed to any naturalist subsumption of psycho-
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logical states under material causal laws. Wordsworth continually scorned
those engineers of human souls who would seek to analyze away selfsustaining moments of self-interpretation and self-recognition in favor of
causally law-governed psychic events, those "Sages who in their prescience

would control / All accidents, and to the very road / Which diey have
fashioned would confine us down / Like engines" (V, 355-58). Persons
are essentially self-interpreting beings, simultaneously looking backward
to see how they have already been disciplined and looking forward to see
how diey can go on, and in diis looking encountering not unambiguous
data, but always already interpreting what they see. What has happened
to make one who one is — a being with certain habits, capacities of activ-

ity, and social relations — is not sharply separable from who one now, in
the effort to go on, imagines oneself to be. Retrospective self-recognition
cannot be wholly parted from prospective self-creation.
Of these and other kindred notions

I cannot say what portion is in truth
The naked recollection of diat time

And what may radier have been called to life
By after meditation.8
(Ill, 612-16)

To ignore or dismiss our moments of self-interpretation in favor of me explanation of events under causal laws is not only to make a mistake about
the situation and interpretive character of consciousness — "Hard task,
vain hope, to analyse die mind, / If each most obvious and particular

thought, / Not in a mystical and idle sense, / But in die words of Reason
deeply weighed, / Hadi no beginning" (II, 228-32) — it is to impoverish

us, to "confine us down" by directing us away from the exercise of our interpretive capacities.
In seeing ourselves as self-interpreting beings and in forging new self-

interpretations, it is important to recognize that, while they are not unambiguous, our specific pasts do nonedieless constrain our self-shaping selfinterpreting. Chandler emphasizes that die interpretive conception of
persons at which Wordsworth arrives, according to which conjectures
about one's past habits and experiences point the way to further expressive
activity, is a specifically English way of thinking about who one is. Wordsworth's deepest moments of self-confrontation, the so-called spots of time

through which he interpretively recovers his discipline and habits of activity and commitments, must be understood, as Chandler puts it, "as
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representing the triumph not only of mental discipline, but also of

discipline as tradition, a discipline grounded on what Burke calls prejudice. In Burke's description, . . . diis conception of discipline is specifically English" (p. 199). In recovering himself interpretively and thus
emerging from melancholy, Wordsworth accomplishes "a reunion not

only with the English countryside but also with die English mind and
character, with a way of thinking and feeling" (p. 200).
This is, in a deep sense, true, in that one emerges as a particular person

as already a part of a specific culture and community, against which one
will take one's bearings and out of whose standard evaluations one will
shape one's own, which dien constitute and maintain one's specific personhood. England is, as it were, die place of Wordsworth's emergence,

and the English respect for English tradition and culture bespeaks a strong
sense of die importance of place and lineage to specific personhood.
Yet in a somewhat deeper sense, Wordsworth's rediscovery of his
Englishness can also be read as metaphorical for his acknowledgment of
the social and historical roots of self-consciousness, responsibility, and
agency in persons in general. Our evaluative and interpretive capacities,

definitive of us as persons, do not originate, Wordsworth shows us, in us
as individuals. Not only does he, in his crisis of waywardness, recapture
his Englishness, he also recaptures the sort of diing that anyone must cap-

ture who is to live expressively as a person. There is a "flaw" or "incoherence" in the individualist conception of personhood and value, and

this shows in Wordsworth's progress; one episode of his crisis of waywardness occurs precisely when he attempts, under die temporary sway of

French rationalism and individualism, to live as a person and as a moral
agent on, in Chandler's phrase, "his private stock of reason." The fruits of
individualism are self-dissipation and melancholy.
Importantly, however, none of mis is to say that one is completely

bound in articulating one's conceptions of value by whatever is locally current. Rather, what goes on as we as evaluators take our points of departure from our culture is that we look, in attempting to extend our evaluations to new situations, to die ideals of flourishing diey were meant to
serve, as it were to their essence. Wordsworth does not recover himself by
beginning to do whatever die English were doing at die moment; he
deplored the "degrading diirst after outrageous stimulation" (Pref., 449)

displayed by his urban countrymen in particular. Instead he attempted to
recover and live according to the deep and hidden values of being

English — where being English means, again, being attached to specific
others and places and reflecting these attachments in conversation, con-
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cern, and poetic activity. Thus, Wordsworth shows us, our situation as
persons emergent in specific places and cultures is to find ourselves confronted with the task of aligning ourselves and our projects widi our

cultures, which may mean, among other things, radically transforming a
culture that had disciplined one in the past but which has now lost touch
widi the ideals that once gave it shape. In going on, with my life, from my
culture, in my culture, and on its behalf, "What I require is a convening of

my culture's criteria, in order to confront them wim my words and life as I
pursue mem and as I may imagine them; and at die same time to confront
my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may
imagine for me: to confront die culture with itself, along die lines in which
it meets in me."9

Thus, in taking up a normative-interpretive approach to the situation

and problems of personhood, one comes to define oneself and to act not
simply according to prevailing custom, but rather according to what one
takes to be best or best served by a complex history of customs and values
itself in need of interpretation. Persons are seen through interpretation as
in their pasts and cultures already on the way, imperfectly and not always
progressively, to die achievement of an immanent human telos. Wordsworth offers us his account of diis telos, putting it before us as objective and

his achievement of it as proleptic, as he describes the understanding of
personhood and value he has arrived at on Snowden and will henceforth

attempt to live by. A certain power of higher minds
... is the very spirit in which diey deal
With the whole compass of the universe:
They from their native selves can send abroad
Kindred mutations; for themselves create
A like existence; and, whene'er it dawns

Created for them, catch it, or are caught
By its inevitable mastery,

Like angels stopped upon the wing by sound
Of harmony from Heaven's remotest spheres.
Them the enduring and the transient both
Serve to exalt; they build up greatest things
From least suggestions; ever on the watch,

Willing to work and to be wrought upon,
They need not extraordinary calls
To rouse them; in a world of life they live,

By sensible impressions not enthralled,
But by their quickening impulse made more prompt
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To hold fit converse with the spiritual world,

And with the generations of mankind
Spread over time, past, present, and to come,
Age after age, till Time shall be no more.
Such minds are truly from die Deity,
For they are Powers; and hence the highest bliss
That flesh can know is dieirs — the consciousness

Of Whom they are, habitually infused
Through every image and through every thought,
And all affections by communion raised
From earth to heaven, from human to divine;
Hence endless occupation for the Soul,
Whedier discursive or intuitive;

Hence cheerfulness for acts of daily life,
Emotions which best foresight need not fear,
Most worthy then of trust when most intense.
Hence, amid ills that vex and wrongs that crush
Our hearts — if here the words of Holy Writ
May with fit reverence be applied — that peace
Which passeth understanding, that repose
In moral judgments which from this pure source

Must come, or will by man be sought in vain.
(XIV, 91-129)

The telos these higher minds achieve and to which, Wordsworth is sug-

gesting, his own past has led him inextricably combines an activity ("for
themselves create," "build up greatest things," "willing to work"), a capacity
for response ("are caught by," "willing ... to be wrought upon," "need not
extraordinary calls to rouse them"), a mood ("bliss," "cheerfulness"), a con-

sciousness ofself("the consciousness / Of Whom they are"), a relation to others
and a power of affection that defeat alienation ("a like existence," "fit converse . . . with all the generations of mankind"), a capacity for agency, self-

responsibility, and morality ("repose in moral judgments"), and an overcoming
of waywardness and disengagement ("Hence endless occupation for the soul").
Persons are reflected to themselves in omers' and dieir own recognitions of

them in activity. Human happiness is neither a state of feeling alone nor a
state of knowledge alone nor a social relation alone nor an activity alone,
but all of these intermingled into joy, that contrary of melancholy which
blends feeling, knowledge, and sociality in activity.

Bodi understanding this telos and arriving at it — acts which are in any
case not wholly separable— are inherently public phenomena, requiring a

community for their realization. Success in revealing others to themselves
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is a criterion of self-understanding as an objectively te/oî-directed being.
But if diis is so, and further if diere are no others to endorse one's inter-

pretations and share in fe/ar-directed expressive activity, dien the selfinterpreting poet will have failed to overcome the subjectivity of value and
will have failed all at once in self-understanding, mood, agency, and activity. The confirmation of a self-interpretation is always deferred to new

audience after new audience, any one of which may always understand
itself and diose it reads (or ignores) differently. Trudifulness or audienticity in self-interpreting is not a matter of describing what is unalterably
there; it is a matter of articulating a self-shaping conception of value, a telos

toward which one lives, in such a way that one's living and personhood
can be recognized and shared in through this articulation.10 One's interpretation of self or value may always be found fantastic or hallucinatory or
self-deluding. The threat of melancholy must always haunt joyful activity.
This fact accounts for the somewhat desperate or pleading tone evident
in Wordsworth's addresses to his audience, from the prayer in the "Prospectus" ("'Fit audience let me find though few!'"),11 to die addresses to
Dorodiy in "Tintern Abbey" ("Oh! yet a litde while / May I behold in thee

what I was once;" "Thy memory be as a dwelling place;" "Nor, perchance,
wilt diou then forget") and above all to Coleridge in the Prelude —

"... thus should neidier I be taught / To understand myself, nor thou to
know / With better knowledge how the heart was framed / Of him thou

lovest; need I dread from thee / Harsh judgments . . ." [I, 626-31]; "And
certain hopes are with me, that to thee / This labour will be welcome,

honoured Friend!" [I, 646-47]; "what we have loved, / Odiers will love,
and we will teach diem how . . ." [XIV, 446-47]). One seeks one's
confirmation and full achievement of personhood in die acceptance by
omers of die then objective telos in the pursuit of which one finds oneself.

We seek to be, for odiers, "joint labourers in the work / (Should Providence such grace to us vouchsafe) / Of their deliverance, surely yet to
come" (XIV, 441-43) by bringing to mem self-knowledge, activity, and
moral peace, delivering them from waywardness. One feels bodi diat the

posited telos of personhood is objective, that its acceptance is "surely yet to
come," and that one cannot know widi certainty that this is so, diat
whedier it is a matter of mysterious grace.

If certainty in self-interpretation always eludes us as we wait upon the
responses of odiers, if, in the end, grace is always required for selfunderstanding, knowledge of value, and the overcoming of waywardness,

dien what closure can diere be to the labor of poetic self-interpretation?
What achievement of self-understanding can there be? What peace?
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In a canceled "Advertisement" to the 1807 edition Poems, in Two
Volumes, Wordsworth remarks that die short poems of that work were

composed "when I had not resolution to apply myselP12 to The Recluse,
the projected great philosophical poem on which he staked his ultimate
value as a poet. As Kenneth Johnston has observed, this "use of the word
resolution . . . suggests that the great 'Resolution and Independence,'
which first appeared in 1807, may ... be a poem about the difficulty of
writing The Recluse [and] avoiding 'despondency and madness' . . . ."13
That is to say, this poem asks how the poet's work of die interpretation of

personhood and its proper telos can be accomplished. The argument of die
poem is that the way of self-understanding is to be found not in a solution
or answer, but only in a resolution which is, as Harold Bloom has noted,
both a way out of, a resolving, of the problem of self-interpretation and an
act of determination, a commitment, to continuous activities of selfinterpretation, remembrance, and conversation.14 These two senses of

resolution are intimately linked; only dirough die activities to which die poet
recommits himself, and not through the mere acceptance of certain propositions, can personhood be sustained and can it come to terms with itself.

"Resolution and Independence" depicts Wordsworth's fall away from and
reattachment to the activities essential to die life of personhood.
The poem opens wim an expression of the poet's sense that nature is
there to be comprehended dirough die use of die senses. ("There was a
roaring in the wind all night; / The rain came heavily and fell in

floods.")15 Now nature is intelligibly present to him. Where once there
was a roaring, now there are singing, chattering, answering, and a sweet
voice, and the poet is able quite precisely to name and know what speaks:
doves, jays, and magpies.
But now the sun is rising calm and bright;
The birds are singing in the distant woods;
Over his own sweet voice the Stock-dove broods;

The Jay makes answer as the Magpie chatters;
And all the air is filled with the pleasant noise of waters.
(3-7)

After the first two lines, the first two stanzas are in die present tense, as

though all that is described is taking place now, at the moment of writing,
so mat the protagonist's present is the author's present, the preceding
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night belonging to both of them. In the third stanza, however, the narrative abruptly shifts into the past tense ("I was a Traveller then upon the
moor; / I saw ...Il heard . . ." [15-18]), where it remains for the rest
of me poem, save for the future tense of die quotation that appears in the

last two lines. The daytime traveler-protagonist is now being remembered
by die poet-narrator. The suggestion of diis shift is diat die poet is now
remembering his earlier experience as a protagonist and drawing on his
memory to solve a present problem in writing, very like the past problem
encountered and resolved by the protagonist. Whatever problem this is, it
is, it seems, one whose resolution must always be reaccomplished. The
closure of self-understanding that is to be achieved consists more in con-

tinuous re-engagement in an activity than in simply knowing certain
truths about persons.

What is diis problem once resolved and now recurring? It is described
straightforwardly as a fall from joy in contemplation of the beautiful and
intelligible natural scene into dejection.
But as it sometimes chanceth, from the might
Of joy in minds diat can no further go,
As high as we have mounted in delight
In our dejection do we sink as low;
To me that morning did it happen so. . . .
(22-26)

There is undoubtedly a kind of psychological dynamic here, reminiscent
of the Boethian wheel of fortune, Chaucer's "joy after woe, woe after
gladnesse," 16 and Keats's view that melancholy "dwells with
Beauty — Beauty that must die; / And Joy, whose hand is ever at his lips /

Bidding adieu, and aching Pleasure nigh, / Turning to poison while the
bee-mouth sips. . . ."17 As Harold Bloom puts it, "the very strength ofjoy
engenders its contrary. When delight reaches its limits, dejection replaces
it."18 But the simple postulation of a psychological dynamic leaves unexplained — especially in light of the general connection in Wordsworth's
writing between melancholy and failures of self-understanding, responsibility, and agency — why the protagonist feels just the particular sort of
dejection he comes to feel and why that dejection can subsequently be

cured through an encounter with another. Why, diere and then, (in the
protagonist's present) and now (in the poet's present), that dejection, with
that cure?

What is more plausible is that this experience of dejection, like others, is

Richard Eldridge287

occasioned precisely by die protagonist's sudden sense ofhis inability as an
isolated merely experiencing individual to know himself, his place in
nature, and his proper end. Recall that the transition to dejection opens
widi die poet's recitation of his perceptions as protagonist ("I saw ... ; I

heard . . . ;" [16-17]). The protagonist had not been particularly concerned with the objectivity of his perceptions, widi whether they accurately represent objects apart from him. ("I heard the distant waters

roar; / Or heard them not, as happy as a boy: " [ 1 7- 1 8 ] . ) Immersed in his
own subjective perceptual experience, the protagonist finds himself apart,
not a member of a community.
The pleasant season did my heart employ:
My old remembrances went from me wholly;
And all the ways of men, so vain and melancholy.
(19-21)

And so he loses himself, as the fleeting pleasantness of the moment masks
the self-dissolving character of the lack of remembrances. Without "the
ways of men," without membership in a community, one is left only with

the flux of one's experience. One becomes unable to go on to lead the life
of a person, expressing one's personhood in action. There is no knowledge, either of nature or of oneself, no sense of one's freedom, purposiveness, or ability to grasp and achieve ends for oneself, no sense of either
power over oneself or a power to apprehend and shape nature: only the inrush of unintelligible subjective experience is left. "And fears and fancies
thick upon me came; / Dim sadness— and blind thoughts, I knew not,
nor could name" (27-28). Without the words provided by the language
one shares with others, one finds oneself unable even to characterize one's

private experience. The protagonist finds himself unable to name what
happens to him, unable to characterize even his own thoughts. The dominant feature of his dejection and his anxiety is his awareness of his apparent lack of autonomy. Things come upon him and to him unbidden,

not under his control. And if blind thoughts and fears and fancies can thus
come unbidden, then why not yet worse things? "But there may come
another day to me— / Solitude, pain of heart, distress, and poverty"
(34-35).
What is the way out of this dejection and to a sense of one's power or

ability to know and to act? It is pointedly not the way of waiting praised in
Milton's claim "who best / Bear his milde yoak, diey serve him best."19
According to Wordsworth, in contrast, we must bring ourselves to act,
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take our lives and fates into our own hands. "But how can He expect diat
odiers should / Build for him, sow for him, and at his call / Love him,
who for himself will take no heed at all?" (39-41). Wordsworth here joins

forces with Hegel, who likewise criticized the religious attitude of "lifeless
indifference which steadfastly wididraws from die busde of existence, alike

from being active as passive, into the simple essentiality of thought."20
Such an attitude enables only an empty, unreal freedom, not a sense of
one's concrete, embodied autonomy and power as an agent and appréhender.
Still, as Hegel also knew, the mere determination to act, not wait, is not

enough to enable freedom, self-knowledge, and self-realization. Alone,
such determination remains a sign of distress. One must concretely find
one's way out of absorption in subjective experience and to actual
knowledge and to rational and expressive action. How can this move be
made?

Only dirough the experience of an other. Locked in his despondency,
and seeking a way out, die protagonist suddenly finds himself to be not
alone.

Now, whether it were by peculiar grace,

A leading from above, a something given,
Yet it befell that, in this lonely place,
When I with these untoward thoughts had striven,
Beside me a pool bare to the eye of heaven
I saw a Man before me unawares:

The oldest man he seemed that ever wore grey hairs.
(50-56)

Despite the language suggestive of divine Providence ("grace," "from
above," "somediing given"), the subordinating conjunction "whether"
makes it clear that the protagonist was unaware of exactly how the other

had come to be there, and that this does not matter, it simply befell him to
find himself in another's presence. So, it will men seem, do persons in

general find diemselves.
The resulting encounter is enabling for me protagonist not so much in
virtue of what the old man says — the protagonist pays litde attention to
that ("his voice to me was like a stream / Scarce heard; nor word from
word could I divide;" [107-8]) — but radier through the old man's serving
as an emblem of both rootedness in nature and community with others. In
the first place, the old man is there, so that sheer aloneness, and conse-

Richard Eldridge289

quent derangement and dejection, clearly need not be permanent condi-

tions. Secondly, the old man is clearly rooted within the natural world, not
subject to fits of solipsistic disconnectedness. His body is nearly made a
part of the natural scene, as he is compared to a stone and to a sea-beast

reposing in the sun (57, 62). But perhaps die most important fact about
the old man is that he is, despite his appearance in this isolated spot, in his
essence neidier a man apart nor a victim of melancholy. The form of his
speech makes it clear that he is a member of a community and that he has
carried the capacities and powers enabled by community membership
with him in his wanderings.
His words came feebly from a feeble chest,
But each in solemn order followed each,
With something of a lofty utterance drest —

Choice word and measured phrase, above the reach
Of ordinary men; a stately speech;
Such as grave Livers do in Scotland use,
Religious men, who give to God and man their dues.
(92-98)

This man's life is informed by a project in which he engages with

others — he is one of those "who give to God and man their dues" — and his
participation in this common project has given him what the protagonist

alone had seemed to lack: the power to speak, to name things, and the
power to act expressively, to grasp and move toward appropriate ends.
Realizing that the old man has acquired these powers by being connected with others, and realizing that the old man and he are alike — they
are in this spot together, and, like the old man, he also in fact comes from
a community — the protagonist finds his mood immediately lightened.
The old man's powers, which survive his reduced circumstances and stem
from his participation in a communal project, make the protagonist aware
of his own powers. If the old man, a figure of consciousness reduced to its
minimal essential condition, retains his powers throughout his solitary
wanderings in virtue of his community with others, then the protagonist

must likewise retain his powers and his connectedness to odiers, even in
his most dejected, passively subjective moments, both in the past and now
in their recurrence. What the poet says of the old man in conclusion provides an apt characterization of himself as well. "I could have laughed

myself to scorn to find / In that decrepit Man so firm a mind" (137-38).
The dejection that had appeared to be unavoidable and possibly perma-
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nent has emerged as a transient mood grounded in a temporary, natural,
and yet naturally overcome forgetting of one's community with others in
direction toward an end.

What the backward-looking poet then learns through his present
memory of this enabling encounter is that characteristically human
nature, or human capacities for self-understanding and freedom, are

realized, or only really exist, as Hegel claimed "in an achieved community
of minds" (para. 69, p. 43), in which alone their exercise is possible. This
is die poetry not of nature and not of die visionary imagination's solitude,
but of the exemplary discovery of the social nature and die possibilities of
life of persons.

Not only is community necessary for self-understanding, agency, and
die overcoming of waywardness, but a certain way of acting and inter-

preting is necessary for community. Our communities will provide
sustenance for our capacities of action and interpretation only as long as
we exercise those capacities and so sustain die community. Thus the protagonist resolves "I'll think of the Leach-gadierer on die lonely moor!"
(140) in order to commit himself, by remembering their locus and home in
a community the Leach-gamerer symbolizes, to the activities of public

self-interpretation and conversation. Only through a resolution to engage
in diese activities is it possible to maintain an end-directed community
that enables the overcoming of dejection and die emergence, out of blind
nature, of die human.

And beyond die protagonist's resolution, there is die poet's actual
remembrance of the protagonist's encounter and his own echoing resolution in the present tense. Here, in the poet's echo of resolution, there is in

fact ongoing activity of self-interpretation. Wordsworth simultaneously
displays in recall and enacts in interpretive activity a self-sustaining com-

mitment to go on with the project of understanding personhood through
its public activities. Self-understanding consists not in abstract knowledge,
but in engagement in cooperative interpretation of the end of persons and
its contextual requirements. Closure is continuation, the acceptance of the

ongoing revelation of ourselves to ourselves that occurs only through our
interpretations of what we do and that enables the overcoming of
waywardness. Resolution is re-engagement in mis interpretive activity;
independence is its fruit.
Ill

To be a person at all, Wordsworth's example shows us, is to be engaged
with odiers in an unending activity of die interpretation of oneself as ob-
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jectively directed to certain ends. In die absence of such activity, there is

no scope for talk about what we do in acting. Interpretive self-activity continuously sustains our personhood. Even quietism, stoicism, and skepticism—conscious withdrawals from die continuing rearticulation and
pursuit of objective ends — are themselves genuine, but defective, modes
of interpretive self-activity.

This interpretive activity is inherendy public, in two important senses.
It bodi begins from the shared conception of value of a community into
which one has been initiated and is carried out in the language of a community. This might be called the fact of die sociality of personhood: diat
persons exist as interpreters of their objective ends only insofar as they live
in society.

But beyond diat, die interpretations of value for persons that one produces are objective for persons in general, insofar as they both are to be

shared and are to enable cooperative and audientic community, itself
necessary for anyone to lead a life fully expressive of personhood. The
telos, posited by Wordsworth, of activity, responsiveness, bliss, con-

sciousness, power, agency, and engagement is not, in his conception,
peculiar to him. And it is only in arriving at a conception of an objective
telos, one by design to be pursued cooperatively by persons in general, that
his personhood is expressed and sustained. This telos may, and must, ad-

mit of various modes of pursuit and achievement: poetry for some, or
politics, or experimental inquiry, or teaching, or child-rearing, or farming. But no matter how variously it may be pursued, the telos to which we
are directed nonedieless sets objective constraints on us; any achievement
of it must display die seven or so features Wordsworth notes. Individuals
are not left free to pursue whatever projects diey wish. The pursuit of this

telos through activity is essential to the maintenance of personhood, to
going on as a person, and its pursuit and achievement necessarily involve
one in a community of similarly directed persons. Together, these might
be called the facts of die community of personhood: diat persons live in
audientic and cooperative society only insofar as they are similarly
directed to objective ends.21
What defects there are in Wordsworth's interpretation of personhood lie

in his occasional failure to acknowledge die community of personhood in
the directedness of all persons to an objective and necessarily cooperatively

achieved end. Wordsworth did a great deal dirough his writing to cure
himself and us by putting forward a new interpretation of personhood diat

ran contrary to die Humean naturalist background. Yet he tended sometimes to live out this interpretation by withdrawing into the role of the
recluse or die isolated sage of Grasmere, abandoning cooperative interac-
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tion with others in general. While it remained his aim always to speak for
us all "from the necessities of [our] nature" (Pref., 445) and further to
write the great poem on social theory mat would set out the conditions for

the cooperative pursuit of variant exemplifications of the human telos, his
retirement too readily suggests that the achievement of this telos can be ac-

complished by educated and isolated elites. Any suggestion of diis tends to
collapse our community in end-directedness into our mere sociality and to
ignore die impoverishment of human possibilities that stem from present
social structures. While it is true that only an interpretation of the
directedness of persons to an objective end can save us from melancholy

and waywardness, it is also true that articulating such an interpretation
alone is not enough: one must also find oneself recognized as living in light

of it by others in general who cooperate in so living. Whether one's audience can accomplish this recognition — whether an audience for one's interpretation even exists — will depend in part upon the material and
cultural circumstances of persons in general, circumstances which one
may hence have an obligation to scrutinize and reform in the interest of

having one's own interpretation of personhood upheld and in the interest
of one's own recovery from melancholy.
Yet, despite his own tendencies to wididraw into retirement and apparent self-completion, it remained Wordsworth's deepest aim both to
display our community in directedness toward an end and to work to see it

acknowledged. That aim is evident both in his ambition to produce a
social philosophy and in the character of his overcoming of melancholy.
His discovery of his directedness to a specific end is one we are all to
repeat, and the pursuit of this end is to become evident as already a common project of which we wül henceforth become self-conscious. As the
poet remembers the protagonist's encounter with the Leech-gatherer, in
mis remembrance uncovering his proper end and finding himself engaged

with odiers in expressive activity directed toward it, so we are to uncover
our end and our engagements in Wordsworth's poetry of remembrance.
Wordsworth's project of eliciting from us a recognition of ourselves as persons directed in activity to an end of responsiveness, bliss, selfconsciousness, power, responsibility, agency, and engagement is intended
as a remembrance of our common nature, and this project may have its
fulfillment in our reading of his work.
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